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WHICH BANKS CHOOSE DEPOSIT INSURANCE?
EVIDENCE OF ADVERSE SELECTION AND MORAL HAZARD IN A
VOLUNTARY INSURANCE SYSTEM
I. Introduction
Many economists have identified federal deposit insurance as an
important contributor to the large number of bank and savings and loan
failures in recent years.1 To the extent of insurance coverage,
depositors have little or no incentive to demand risk premia on deposit
interest rates, and therefore a bank’s cost of funds does not increase
proportionally with its insolvency risk. Deposit insurance subsidizes
risk-taking, therefore, creating a “moral hazard” in that banks with
insured deposits will find it optimal to assume more risk than they
would otherwise.2 In recent years increased competition and liability
deregulation have both encouraged and enabled depository institutions to
increase risk-taking, and the number of failures has risen
dramatically.
Federal deposit insurance was enacted in 1933 in response to the
bank failures of the Great Depression. Deposit insurance was not,
however, a new policy. During the 19th and early 20th centuries a
number of states had experimented with their own insurance plans, and in
the l930s deposit insurance opponents pointed to the unsatisfactory
performance of many of these plans as evidence that federal insurance
1 See Kane (1985, 1989), Kaufman (1989, pp. 208-09), and O’Driscoll
~l988), for example.
If regulators can accurately monitor bank risk and charge risk-
adjusted premiums, there would be no incentive for banks to assume more
risk than they would in the absence of insurance. Several studies have
proposed risk-adjusted premiums, e.g., General Accounting Office (1991),
date, however, premiums remain unrelated to failure risk.
Although federal deposit insurance was enacted in 1933, risk-taking
was contained and failures were not a problem as long as regulations
limited competition and protected charter values, and interest rates
remained relatively low and stable [Keeley (1990)].2
could not work. The American Bankers Association (1933, 43), for
example, argued:
As a matter of unbiased history ... the guaranty of deposits
plan proved fallacious and unworkable.... It has proved to
be one of those plausible, but deceptive, human plans that,
in actual application only serve to render worse the very
evils they seek to cure.
More detached study of the state plans finds that some worked
better than others. Calomiris (1989) concludes that the 19th century
Indiana insurance system, for example, minimized moral hazard problems
by introducing a form of coinsurance that gave banks the incentive and
ability to monitor each other and enforce conservative behavior. The
plans of other states, like the infamous New York Safety Fund, suffered
extensively from moral hazard and from adverse selection, i.e., that
risk-prone banks chose to join the insurance system while conservative
banks stayed out, leaving depositors without credible insurance.4
A number of proposals have been offered to reform the present
deposit insurance system, from increased regulation of bank activities
to privatization of deposit insurance.5 Calomiris (1989) has shown that
the 19th and early 20th century state deposit insurance systems can
provide considerable insight into the current crisis and suggest how
deposit insurance might be reformed to minimize problems in the future.
This paper presents new evidence on the incentive effects of deposit
insurance by studying the insurance system of Kansas, which operated
from 1909 to 1929. The Kansas system had a number of unique features
that were intended to limit risk-taking, including voluntary membership.
This aspect makes it possible to compare the behavior of insured and
Cooke (1909), Robb (1921), Federal Deposit Insurance System (1956)
and Golembe (1960) also compare the various state systems.
O’Driscoll (1990) critiques a number of reform proposals.3
non-insured banks. Such a comparison of banks today is impossible since
virtually all banks are insured by the FDIC.6 Kansas officials imposed
other regulations on insured banks, and supervision was reputed to be
relatively strong. We test explicitly for moral haza:~i and adverse
selection effects in the Kansas system in order to gauge whether these
measures achieved their goals, as well as to offer new insights into the
performance of different deposit insurance arrangements.
II. The Kansas Deposit Insurance System
Kansas was the second of eight states to adopt an insurance system
in response to an increase in bank failures following the Panic of
l907.~ Membership was made voluntary, however, in response to
complaints that deposit insurance penalizes conservative banks by
forcing them to insure depositors of banks that are more likely to fail.
Kansas officials were well aware that deposit insurance would be most
attractive to risk-prone institutions, and imposed a number of
regulations to limit adverse selection. Banks were required to have
been in business for at least one year and undergo a state inspection
before being admitted to the insurance system. Insured banks were
further required to maintain capital of at least 10 percent of total
deposits and surplus and undivided profits of at least 10 percent of
total capital.8
6 Federal deposit insurance is mandatory for all Federal Reserve member
banks, and optional for state-chartered non-member banks. At present,
99% of all commercial banks, holding 99.5% of deposits are insured
~Kaufman 1989, p. 320).
The eight states were Kansas, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Dakota,
~klahoma, South Dakota, Texas, and Washington.
Total capital is the sum of the par value of the bank’s stock, the
paid-in surplus, and undivided profits.4
To limit risk-taking by insured banks, the state imposed interest
rate ceilings on insured deposits and set insurance premiums that were
inversely related to a bank’s capital to deposit ratio. Insurance
premiums were initially set at 1/20th of 1% of a bank’s insured deposits
less capital and surplus. Because of the low assessment rate, however,
the reward for holding extra capital was small relative to the cost of
capital.9 If necessary to maintain the solvency of the insurance fund,
assessments could be increased to 1/5th of 1% of deposits. To guarantee
assessment payment, banks were required to deposit $500 of cash or
eligible bonds with the state treasurer for each $100,000 of insured
deposits. Banks could withdraw from the insurance system with six
months notice; they remained liable, however, for assessments needed to
reimburse depositors of failed banks during that period.10 Finally, the
state bank commissioner had the authority to suspend insurance for any
bank found in violation of state regulations.11
In its early years the deposit insurance system was popular with
both bankers and depositors. From 1909 to 1920, the number of insured
banks and the deposits in those banks grew faster than those of non-
insured state and national banks. The participation rate among eligible
banks peaked at 65.6% in 1923, and the percentage of the state’s
A bank with $100,000 of eligible deposits, for example, would be
charged $45 per year if it had capital and surplus of $10,000, or $42.50
it had $15,000 of capital and surplus.
See Cooke (1909) for a complete list of membership requirements and
comparison with those of other states.
1 The reports of the bank commissioner do not state whether the
insurance of any banks was suspended, and so we have been unable to
determine whether this threat was credible.5
deposits held in insured banks reached a high of 43.8% in 1921 [Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (1956, p. 68)].12
The popularity of the insurance system declined, however, after a
collapse of farm output prices in mid-1920 brought increased loan
defaults and bank failures. Members of the insurance system proved to
be the most susceptible to failure. Between 1920 and 1926, the failure
rate of insured banks was 4.6%, versus 2.3% for non-insured state banks
and just 0.8% for national banks [American Bankers Association (1933, p.
34)]. After the failure in 1923 of the American State Bank of Wichita,
the state’s largest insured bank, threatened the solvency of the
insurance fund, other banks began to withdraw from the system to avoid
increased insurance premiums.13 A state supreme court ruling in 1926
permitted banks to withdraw without liability for further assessments by
simply forfeiting the securities they had deposited with the state as a
guarantee of assessment payment. Many banks then dropped out and,
although the fund was not officially closed until 1929, the insurance of
bank deposits in Kansas effectively ended.
The high failure rate of insured Kansas banks during the early
l920s indicates that the regulations intended to limit risk-taking were
not entirely effective. For a random sample of Kansas banks in 1920,
Wheelock (1992) finds that insured banks maintained less adequate
capital than non-insured banks.14 Wheelock also finds indirect evidence
12 National banks were prohibited from participating in the state
insurance system by a 1908 ruling of the Comptroller of the Currency.
Unincorporated banks, trust companies, and state chartered banks not
~eting the other membership requirements were also ineligible.
It is conceivable that the benefits of insurance also declined if
depositors began to question the solvency of the system, and hence to
~mand risk premia on insured deposits.
The sample consisted of 160 insured and 99 non-insured banks. The
average capital/asset ratio of insured banks was .134 and that of non-6
that insured banks held higher risk portfolios, in that after
controlling for capital adequacy, insurance status remains useful for
predicting failure.15 It is unclear, however, whether the effect of
deposit insurance was to cause banks to be more risk-taking ‘~rmerely to~
sort risk-prone from conservative banks. In this paper we attempt to
discern whether the greater risk-taking by insured banks was due to
moral hazard, adverse selection, or both.
III. Adverse Selection in the Kansas System
If deposit insurance premiums are not tied to failure risk, then
risk-prone banks will gain the most from the inherent insurance subsidy;
hence they should be more likely to join a voluntary insurance system
than conservative banks. We test for self-selection in the Kansas
system by attempting to predict the insurance status of a random sample
of eligible banks in 1910 using balance sheet information about them in
1908, the year prior to the introduction of deposit insurance.16 We
employ a probit regression framework, in which the dependent variable is
a dummy that takes the value 1 if the bank was insured in 1910 and 0 if
not.
If risk-prone banks were more willing to pay the costs of
membership in the insurance system, we expect that less well capitalized
insured banks .163. The difference is statistically significant at the
~0l level.
The closer a bank was to failure, the better insurance status is at
distinguishing failing from non-failing banks. The behavior of insured
Kansas banks thus appears to have been like that of the “zombie” S&Ls of
the 1980s that were insolvent, but permitted by regulators to remain
open [Kane (1989)]. This behavior is consistent with the model of
Furlong and Keeley (1989), in which risk-taking is higher the lower is
the capital/asset ratio.
16 Our sample consists of approximately one-fourth of the Kansas banks
that were eligible for insurance in 1910. The data comes from biennial
reports of the Kansas Commissioner of Banking. Complete source
information is in the appendix.7
banks were more likely to join the insurance system than others. We
employ two alternative financial ratios, total capital to assets
(capital/assets) and surplus and undivided profits to loans and
discounts (surplus/loans), to test this hypothesis.17 We expect the
coefficients on each to be negative, i.e., that banks with lower capital
ratios had a greater likelihood of joining the insurance system.
Loans are generally the most risky assets that banks hold;
moreover, the loan portfolios of the small unit banks of Kansas were
likely not well diversified. Wheelock (1992) finds that the higher was
a bank’s loan to asset ratio, the more likely it was to fail within two
years of the balance sheet date. Thus the coefficient on this variable
(loans/assets) should be positive in our insurance status regressions,
since banks with relatively high ratios appear to have been riskier than
others, and so might have had a greater demand for insurance.
Conservative banks are likely to hold relatively large reserves
with which to meet deposit withdrawals. Although cash and other reserve
items have low (or no) explicit yields, a high reserve to deposit ratio
better enables a bank to accommodate unexpected deposit outflows without
resorting to high-priced borrowing. Thus, we expect that banks with
relatively high reserve to deposit ratios (cash/deposits) would in
general be less risk-taking, and so the coefficient on this variable
should be negative.
We also include the deposits to assets (deposits/assets) ratio as
an independent variable, Presumably insurance lowered the cost of
deposits, and hence the more a bank relied on deposits as a source of
17 White (1984) and Wheelock (1992) both find the surplus/loan ratio to
be important for distinguishing failing from non-failing banks.8
funds the greater its demand for insurance. Thus a positive coefficient
on this variable might be expected. It is likely, however, that the
banks relying most heavily on deposits in 1908 were conservative banks
that could attract deposits at a relatively low price because of their
safety. In the days before insurance, banks routinely advertised their
strength and conservatism. Risky banks with weak balance sheets
probably had to pay higher interest rates to attract deposits, and
therefore might have relied less heavily on them as a source of funds.
This suggests that the coefficient on the ratio of deposits to assets
should in fact be negative.
In a study of national banks failing during the banking panic of
1930, White (1984) found that the higher a bank’s ratio of U.S.
Government bonds to assets, the lower was its failure probability. If
large bond holdings reflected relatively conservative behavior, then in
the insurance status regressions it seems reasonable to expect a
negative coefficient on the bond to asset ratio (bonds/assets). There
is no information, however, about the quality or type of bonds that
Kansas banks held in 1908, and it is unlikely that U.S. Government bonds
comprised a significant portion of their portfolios before World War I.
In the absence of such information, it is impossible to predict the sign
of this variable’s coefficient with confidence.
Finally, we include the ratio of bills payable and other
liabilities to assets (bills pay./assets) as a regressor. The principal
source of funds for a bank are deposits. But a bank might rely on
alternative sources of funds if it is unable to attract sufficient
deposits to finance expansion or to remain liquid in the event of
deposit withdrawals or loan defaults. Wheelock (1992) and White (1984)9
find that heavy reliance on non-deposit sources for funds is a useful
predictor of bank failure, suggesting that risk-prone banks were more
likely to have high ratios. It is reasonable therefore to expect a
positive coefficient on this variable in the insurance status model.
Relatively few banks had significant bills payable or other liabilities
in 1908, however, so we are unsure how important this variable is likely
to be here.18
We include two additional variables to help explain insurance
status: bank size, as measured by the log of total assets (ln Assets),
and the number of years since the bank received its charter (Age). On
average, insured banks tended to be larger than non-insured banks, and
we are interested in whether size remains important after controlling
for other bank characteristics. We include age to capture intangibles,
such as goodwill or management quality, that might have affected a
bank’s decision to join the insurance system, For example, depositors
might have felt more secure putting their money in a bank that had been
in business for many years. Older banks might have had less demand for
insurance because they already enjoyed a comparatively low cost of
deposits. If true, then the coefficient on age should be negative: the
longer a bank had been in business, the less likely it was to join the
insurance system.
Model estimates are reported in Table 1. We find that the lower a
bank’s capital to asset ratio in 1908, the more likely it was to belong
to the insurance system in 1910. This strongly suggests adverse
selection: risk-prone banks were more likely to join than were
18 Of 182 banks in the sample, 55 had outstanding bills payable or
other liabilities, but in many cases the amounts were quite small.10
conservative banks. The coefficient on an alternative measure of
capital adequacy, the surplus to loan ratio, is not statistically
significant. Equation 1.1 also indicates that the higher a bank’s loan
to asset ratio or bond to assets ratio, the more likely it was to join
the insurance system. The sign and significance of the coefficient on
the bond to asset ratio is consistent across specifications, but that on
the loan to asset ratio is not.
We find that the higher a bank’s deposit to asset ratio in 1908,
the less likely it was to join the insurance system, suggesting that
banks relying relatively heavily on deposits before the founding of the
system did so because they were conservative and could attract deposits
at comparatively low cost. The ratio of cash and other reserves to
deposits does not appear of any value in predicting insurance status,
however, nor does the ratio of bills payable and other liabilities to
assets.
Equation 1.3 omits the bond to assets and bills payable to assets
ratios.19 The only substantive difference with this specification is
the statistical significance of bank size: larger banks appear to have
been somewhat more likely to join the insurance system. We also find
that the more years a bank had been in business, the less likely it was
to join the insurance system. Apparently, established banks gained less
from joining the insurance system in terms of lower deposit costs than
did newer banks.
19 We report this specification since we are unable to predict the
coefficient sign of the bonds/assets ratio, and because few banks had
large amounts of bills payable outstanding in 1908.11
IV. Risk-Taking in the Mature System
It seems apparent that the first members of the Kansas deposit
guaranty fund were riskier than those banks electing to not join the
system. Did adverse selection continue to characterize the system over
time? We have collected data for a panel of banks from 1910 to 1920,
the years when the Kansas system was growing in terms of membership and
percentage of the state’s bank deposits. Our random sample consists of
212 eligible banks that operated continuously from 1910 to 1920.20 We
use these data to explore further whether the Kansas system suffered
from the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard.21
Balance sheet comparison of insured and non-insured banks
indicates that insured banks were less well capitalized. Table 2
reports comparisons of the mean capital/asset and surplus/loan ratios
for insured and non-insured banks in each year of our sample. The mean
ratios of insured banks were lower than those of non-insured banks in
each year.22 We have disaggregated these data further to compare the
mean ratios of newly insured banks and insured banks that had also been
20 Our data are for a random sample of one-fourth the eligible state
banks in 1914. We collected data for each of these banks from the
Kansas Commissioner of Banking reports for 1910, 1914, 1918, and 1920,
which are the only years for which balance sheets were published. All
of the banks in the sample operated in each year, but we eliminated 28
banks from the sample in 1910 because they did not meet the various
requirements for membership in the insurance system. Since all of the
banks remaining in the sample were in business before the insurance
system began, it excludes any banks opened for the purpose of exploiting
the insurance system, which means our results should understate the
~xtent of adverse selection and moral hazard in the Kansas system.
1 We use the term “moral hazard” to mean any risk-taking induced by
deposit insurance, whether observable by the insurer or not, and our
measures of risk, the capital/asset and surplus/loan ratios, obviously
w~reobservable on the reporting dates.
2 For both ratios the differences between insured and non-insured
banks are statistically significant (at the .05 level or higher) in 1910
and 1920. For 1914 and 1918, the difference in the capital/asset ratio
is significant.12
members in the previous reporting year.23 In each year newly insured
banks had higher capital ratios than other insured banks, but both had
lower mean capital ratios than non-insured banks. Banks joining the
insurance system thus appear to have been riskier than those staying
out. That banks belonging to the system in the previous year had the
lowest ratios could reflect risk-taking induced by membership, or simply
that the highest risk banks were the first to join the system.
Further evidence of how insurance system membership affected bank
behavior is presented in Table 3. Here we compare the mean year to year
changes in the capital ratios for uninsured banks, newly insured banks,
and other insured banks. Between 1910 and 1914 the mean capital/asset
ratio of uninsured banks rose, as it did for those insured in both
years. It fell, however, for banks acquiring insurance between 1910 and
1914. Furthermore, the mean surplus/loan ratio increased least for
newly insured banks.24 Between 1914 and 1918 the mean capital/asset
ratio of each class declined. Interestingly, the decline was largest
for non-insured banks. Moreover, newly insured banks were the only
class to have an increase in the surplus/loan ratio. This was also true
between 1918 and 1920. It is clear from Table 2 that insured banks,
particularly those having been insured for some time, were less well
capitalized than non-insured banks. Comparison of changes in capital
ratios is less illuminating, however, indicating a relative increase in
23 Only three banks in our sample left the insurance system before
1920, one between 1910 and 1914 and two between 1914 and 1918. We are
Wnable to determine whether they withdrew voluntarily.
The differences in the capital/asset change and the surplus/loan
change between non-insured and newly insured banks are significant at
the .10 and .01 levels, respectively. The differences between newly
insured and other insured banks are not significant.13
risk for newly insured banks between 1910 and 1914, but not for other
years.
To further study whether the Kansas deposit insurance s,stem
caused increased risk-taking, or simply attracted banks that would have
been riskier in any event, we estimate a two-equation model of the
following type:





where Y1 measures the riskiness of a bank and Y2” measures its
(unobserved) desire to belong to the deposit insurance system. We
observe Y2, which is a dichotomous variable defined as:
= 1 if Y2~>0
= 0 otherwise.
In other words, a bank joins the insurance system only when its desire
to do so exceeds a certain threshold (which we normalize to zero). If
adverse selection is present then ~2 will be positive. Similarly, if
insurance system membership encourages risk-taking, then ~ will be
positive. The X variables in (1) and (2) represent various regressors
believed to affect bank riskiness and the desire to carry deposit
insurance. They are discussed below.
The parameters of Equation (2) cannot be estimated consistently
with maximum likelihood probit because Y1 is endogenous and correlated
with u2. Similarly, the OLS estimates of (1) (replacing y2* with Y2)
may be inconsistent because Y2 and u1 may not be independent.
Consistent estimates can, however, be obtained from the reduced form of
(1) and (2), viz.,
(3)14
*
= ir2X + V
2
. (4)
Our interest is in the structural parameters (a1, a2, /~l,and fl2), which
can be recovered uniquely from it
1 and it
2 only if (1) and (2) are exactly
identified.
To estimate the structural parameters consistently, we adopt the






= var(v2)) can be estimated consistently only
by applying maximum likelihood probit to Equation (4). Thus we rewrite
(4) as:
** ** *
= Y2 /“2 = (ir2/ci2)X + v2/cr2
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2 X + v2
. (4a)






= (a2/a2)Yl + (~32
1/a2)X2
+ u2/a2. (6)
In the first stage, consistent estimates of it
1 and it
2~ are obtained
using OLS and maximum likelihood probit to estimate (3) and (4a),
respectively. These estimates are then used to form instruments for Y1
** -~‘ ~** ,~*
andY2
, viz., Y1
= ir1X and Y2
= it
2 X, respectively. In stage two,
**
we apply OLS to Equation (5) after replacing Y2 with Y2
. Similarly,
maximum likelihood probit is used to estimate (6) when Y1 is replaced
with ~1. The resulting estimates are consistent.25
We measure risk (Y1) with the capital/asset ratio, and expect
(a2/a2) to be negative if adverse selection is present. Y2 is a binary
variable reflecting the insurance status of a bank, 1 if insured and 0
if not. The control variables, X1 and X2, are those we believe might
25 Note that the estimated parameters are (a1a2), (a2/a2), /~l~ and
(~2/a2);~ cannot be identified.15
have affected a bank’s risk-taking or its decision to join the deposit
insurance system.
The results in Table 1 indicate that membership in the deposit
insurance system was related negatively to age. We therefore include
this variable (Age) in X2.26 It seems likely that competition
influenced a bank’s decision to join the insurance system, and this
could explain why newer banks were more likely to join. Established
banks might have been able to attract deposits at relatively low cost,
and therefore had less demand for insurance.
We include two additional variables that capture other aspects of
competition and thus which might have affected a bank’s membership
decision. For each bank we include the ratio of insured to total banks
in the bank’s county (Dlratio). In order to compete successfully for
deposits, a bank might have been more likely to join the insurance
system if most of its competitors were also members, regardless of its
own preferences for risk. Banks in counties with few members might have
felt less competitive pressure to join themselves.
We also include the ratio of total banks to county population
(Bankpop) as a regressor. Because branching was not permitted, rural
counties with low population density typically had the highest numbers
of banks per person. It has often been argued that rural banking
markets were disrupted by a. dramatic decline in transportation costs
between 1910 and 1920, as rural roads were improved and many farmers
26 Although insurance system membership was also related to bank size
and various financial ratios we do not include these variables in X2
since they are notexogenous, but jointly determined with insurance
status.16
acquired an automobile or truck for the first time.27 Regions with the
highest numbers of banks per capita were most affected, therefore, as
previously isolated banks were suddenly thrown into competition with one
another. Those banks might have been more likely to join the deposit
insurance system in effort to compete successfully in the new
environment. 28
To explain a bank’s risk-taking we again include bank age and
competition, as measured by the number of banks divided by population.
We also include measures of local economic conditions that might have
caused bank capital/asset ratios to vary systematically across counties.
Aside from competitive changes induced by transportation improvements,
banks located in rural counties might have behaved differently than
those in cities, and so we include the percent rural of county
population (Rural). Similarly, the capital/asset ratios of banks
located in counties with relatively rapid economic growth might have
been different than those of banks in other counties. Among the
variables we include to control for differences in economic conditions
are the overall change in county population between 1910 and 1920
(L~Pop), the percentage change in county improved farm acreage from 1910
to 1920 (L~Impacre), and the percentage change in farm land value per
acre from 1910 to 1920 (E~Landvàlue).29 We also include regional and
27 See Alston, Grove and Wheelock (1991) and Wheelock (1992) for
references and analysis of the consequences of this technological change
bank failures.
L
8 Keeley (1990) concludes that increased competition in recent years
has eroded bank charter values and increased risk-taking. This suggests
that greater competition may have increased the demand for insurance, as
well as the incentive to take on additional risk.
29 Changes in improved acreage tended to be highest in western counties
since most of eastern Kansas was already cultivated by 1910, while
changes in land value per acre were greatest in eastern Kansas.17
annual dummy variables in both the deposit insurance and capital/asset
ratio regressions to control further for systematic variation across
regions and time.3°
Our structural equation estimates are presented in Table 4. The
results indicate that the Kansas deposit insurance system suffered from
both adverse selection and moral hazard effects. In Equation 4.1 the
coefficient on the predicted values of deposit insurance membership (i~[)
is negative and statistically significant, supporting the hypothesis
that membership in the insurance system led banks to hold lower
capital/asset ratios than non-participating banks. There is some
evidence also that banks in rural counties and those located in counties
with relatively large increases in land value had higher ratios.31
Equation 4.2 indicates that adverse selection also characterized
the deposit insurance system between 1910 and 1920. The coefficient on
C/A (the capital/asset ratio “predicted” in the first-stage) is negative
and statistically significant, showing that risk-prone banks had a
higher demand for deposit insurance than did conservative banks. The
positive and significant coefficient on the ratio of insured to total
banks (Dlratio) indicates also that a bank was more likely to belong to
the system if its closest competitors were also members.32
30 A full description of our data and sources is presented in the
~pendix.
~ Each regression was estimated with four regional dummies and four
dummies marking the years from which the balance sheet data are drawn.
None of the regional dummies has a significant coefficient; those on the
dummies for 1910 and 1914 are positive and statistically significant,
while that for 1918 is negative and marginally significant. The dummy
~or 1920 was omitted.
2 Since Dlratio is the ratio of insured to total banks in a county, in
counties with few banks (three counties had but 1 bank) the membership
decision of a single bank has a large influence on this variable. Thus
by including this variable as a regressor, we bias the other regressor
coefficients toward zero and against finding adverse selection.18
V. Conclusion
The Kansas deposit insurance system suffered from both adverse
selection and moral hazard. Using balance sheet information from 1908,
the year before the introduction of deposit insurance, we are able to
distinguish banks that joined the system in its first year of operation
from those which did not. The lower a bank’s capital/asset or
deposit/asset ratio in 1908, the more likely it was to be a member of
the system two years later. Risk-prone banks thus appear to have had a
greater demand for deposit insurance and were the first to join the
system.
Adverse selection continued to characterize the deposit insurance
system throughout its first decade. We estimate a simultaneous equation
model in order to disentangle adverse selection from risk-taking induced
by insurance system membership, and conclude that both effects were
present: risk-prone banks had a greater demand for deposit insurance and
were more likely to join the system, while insurance system membership
appears to have led banks to become riskier.
The findings of the paper should not be surprising. Since risk-
prone banks gain the most from deposit insurance, it makes sense that a
voluntary deposit insurance system in which premiums are imperfectly
tied to risk would attract the most risk-prone banks. Moreover, in
order to avoid subsidizing other insured banks, an insured bank would
have an incentive to increase risk. Our evidence shows that these
incentives were not contained by regulations or supervision.
Ultimately, the Kansas deposit insurance system collapsed, and
depositors of failed banks were not reimbursed. The experience of
Kansas, and other states having insurance systems, illustrates the19
difficulty of designing a system that does not ultimately break down and
shows that the experience of the 1980s was far from unique.TABLE 1
Which Banks Choose Insurance? Probit Model Estimates
Dependent Variable: Insurance Status in 1910







Loans/ 6.17 —0.02 0.97
Assets (l.90)** (0.01) (0.48)
Cash/ 4.31 —0.31 0.40
Deposits (1.74) (0.23) (0.26)
Deposits/ —9.08 —2.42 —5.96
Assets (2.57)*** (l.57)* (2.74)***
Bills Pay./ —4.86 3.27
Assets (0.70) (0.57)
Age —0.03 —0.01 —0,03
(l.47)* (0.79) (l.62)*
ln Assets 0.26 0.14 0.39
(1.28) (0.76) (2.30)**
Log Likelihood —106.56 —109.71 —110.16
Obs. 182 182 182
No. Insured 60 60 60
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; ***, **, * indicate statistically
significant at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively (one-tail
tests).TABLE 2
Capital Ratio Comparisons,


























DI1O equals 0 for banks that were not
those that were insured. DI14, DI18,
An entry of 0/1 includes both insured
insured in 1910 and equals 1 for
and DI2O are defined similarly.
and non-insured banks.
a One bank that was a member of the insurance system in 1910 was not in












































































































C/Al4—C/Al0 and S/Ll4—S/L1O are the differences in the mean
capital/asset and surplus/loan ratios between 1910 and 1914 for the
category of banks indicated. C/A18—C/l4 and S/Ll8—S/L14, and C/A20—C/l8
and S/L2O—S/Ll8 are defined similarly.
a These comparisons are for only those bank that were eligible for
insurance in 1910.
b One bank that was an insurance system member in 1910 was not in 1914,














Tests for Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
Second-Stage Estimates
Dependent Variables: Capital/Assets (Eq. 4.1),
























log like. 1164.30 -377.81
obs. 820 820
Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses; ***, **, and * indicate
statistically significant at the .01, .05, and .10 levels (two-tail
tests).
a the coefficients in this regression have been multiplied by 100.
Each regression also included regional dummies and dummies for each
balance sheet year.
Variable definitions and data sources: see text and appendix.Appendix
Variable Definitions and Data Sources
All data for individual Kansas banks are from the Biennial Report of the
Bank Commissioner (various years).
Age: the number of years between a bank’s charter date and balance sheet
date.
Bankpop: the number of state chartered banks in a county divided by
county population. Sources: Biennial Report of the Bank
Commissioner (number of banks), and 15th Census of the United
States: Population, Vol. 1, Kansas Table 3 (1930, pp. 401-02).
Dlratio: the ratio of insured to total state banks in a county. Source:
Biennial Report of the Bank Commissioner.
i~Impacre: the percentage change in county improved farm acreage, 1910 to
1920. Source: 14th Census of the United States: Agriculture,
Vol. 6, part 1, Kansas Table 1 (1920, pp. 732-41),
~Landvalue: the percentage change in county farm land value per acre,
1910 to 1920. Source: 14th Census of the United States:
Agriculture, Vol. 6, part 1, Kansas Table 1 (1920, pp. 732-41).
APop: the percentage change in county population, 1910 to 1920. Source:
15th Census of the United States: Population, Vol. 1, Kansas
Table 3 (1930, pp. 401-02).
Rural: the proportion of a counties population located on farms or towns
of less than 2500 persons. Source: 14th Census of the United
States: Population, Vol. 1, Table 50 (1920, p. 158).References
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